Floyd Harmer, Stanley D. Roberts, G. Marion Hinckley, As The Board Of County Commissioners For Utah County, And As The County Board Of Equalization, And As Individual Taxpayers In Ut.A.H County; Harrison Conover, As Utah County Assessor; Elwood L. Sundberg, As Utah County Auditor; Maurice C. Bird, As Utah County Treasurer; C. Steven Hiatch, As A Resident Of And Taxpayer In Utah County v. State Tax Commission : Petition For Rehearing by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
Floyd Harmer, Stanley D. Roberts, G. Marion
Hinckley, As The Board Of County
Commissioners For Utah County, And As The
County Board Of Equalization, And As Individual
Taxpayers In Ut.A.H County; Harrison Conover,
As Utah County Assessor; Elwood L. Sundberg, As
Utah County Auditor; Maurice C. Bird, As Utah
County Treasurer; C. Steven Hiatch, As A Resident
Of And Taxpayer In Utah County v. State Tax
Commission : Petition For Rehearing
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Vernon B. Romney and Bill Thomas Peters; Attorneys for
Petitioner
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Harmer v. State Tax Comm'n, No. 11369 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4413
In The Supreme Court .. ,:\,"'v 
of the State of Utah·~.\~~: 
. ···t 
t: • OYD HARMER, STANLEY D. ROBERTS, '.', ":•t~ 
n..G. MARION HINCKLEY, as the Board of ···»:;"'' 1 
County Commissioners for Utah ~· .. ; .r·~ · ,f:J."' 
aad as the County Board of Equaliz~ ·, , . ':. · 
and as individual taxpayers ia Utah County; .. :_ · }lj'"';i~· 
HARRISON CONOVER, as Utah Couaq '··; :'"' · )!{: :I\." 
Alse11or; ELWOOD L. SUNDBEI\.G-• •·; .. ·t·.:i,~J'~: U~L Co A di MAUIUCE C. .. .,....... . • ...... "'""' q11 unty u tor; · »UIU1'• · 1 ~):· ,JJ · 
u Utah County Treasurer; C. iTIVElf:~- i . ..," · 
' HATCH, as a resident and tu.payer of ~1 
C.OUnty, · : · ·' · '· .. . f 
Plaintiffs, ~ ~"i '. 
Cross-'D ·-cmdea'b, . · .. , · -~·· 
... ~ .. 7· ~1. ...... ~, •. 
. •I'·:; 
M. DALE JEFFS e~iE~~o~~LOCK F I Li.,·.~ . · ..
...-ial County Attorney 
IOYD L. PARK 
Deputy County Attorney 
., 43 East 200 North -·-ci;.-:i-·s;~~:. 
Provo, Utah . l_,J • 
. Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants · . '.. · 1 ~ ;{j~. 
' ii'( • • ,, . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
GR.OU hTDS FOR PETITION 
Sl1PPORTING BRIEF 
1, 2, 3 
4 
CONCLUSION 17' 18 
CASES CITED 
:\ lherts v. Board of Supervisors of County of San Mateo, 
193 Cal. App. 2d 225, 14 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1961) 16 
'-\lfrcd J. Sweet, Inc. Y. City of Auburn, 180 A. 803 
(1935) ·····-------- 6 
Crothers v. County of S;rnta Cruz, 311 P. 2d 5 57 ( 1957) 8 
Duhame v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 179 P. 2d. 
252 (1947) 7 
Gr.cat Northern Ry. v. \'?eeks, 297 U.S. 135, 56 S. Ct. 
"126, so L. Ed. 532 (1936) 6 
I-Linilton v. Adkins, 250 Alabama 557, 35 So. 2d 183 
'.nterstatc o;l Pipeline Co. v. Guilbeau, 46 So. 2d 113 
(1950) 
L:~~r:ett Co. Y. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 5 3 S. Ct. 481, 77 L. Ed. 
929 (1933) 
15 
10 
L>rd v. County of Marin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 248 ( 1963 16 
r.uh:)(JCk Hotel Co. v. Lubbock Independent School Dist-
rict 8 5 S.W. 2d 776 ( 193 5) ------- - 7 
1\,1.i" Dcpa~·tment Stores Co. v. State Tax Commission of 
i'Vh,sowi 303 S.W. 2d 748 (1958) _ 8, 12, 17 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Pag, 
Mahoacy v. Cicy of S'.ln Diego, 198 California 388, 245 P. 
2d 189 ( 1926) - -- -- --- - - --------- ----
Rowley v. Chic'.lgo and N. W. Ry., 293 U.S. 102, 5 5 S. 
Ct. 55, 79 L. Ed 222 (1934) _____ _ 
Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 66 New 
Mexico 221, 345 P. 2d 750, 76 A.LR. 2d 1070 
(1959) _ 7, 12, 13, I\ 
Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. 
S. 350, 38 S. Ct. 't95, 1)2 L. Ed. 1154 (1918) 5, 9, 10, II 
CONSTITUTIONS CITED 
Missnuri Constitution, J-\ rt. X, Sections 3, 5 8, J 7 
New Mexico Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 
United State~ Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
UtJh Constitution, Art. XIII, Section 3 2. 7, 9 
STATUTES CITED 
Uuh Code Annotated (1953), 59-5-46.1 2. 9 
Senate Bill No. 20, Laws of Utah, 1969, Amending Utah 
Code Annotated ( 19 5 3 I, 59-5-46.1 3, 13 
Utah Code Annotated ( 19 5 3), 5 9-5 -47 11 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
51 Am Jur., "T:ixation" 
76 A. L. R. 2d 1071 4 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FLOYD HARMER, STANLEY D. ROBER TS, 
G. MARION HINCKLEY, as the Board of 
County Commissioners for Utah County, 
and as the County Board of Equalization, 
and as individual taxpayers in Utah County; 
HARRISON CONOVER, as Utah County 
Assessor; EL WOOD L. SUNDBERG, as 
Utah County Auditor; MAURICE C. BIRD, 
as Utah County Treasurer; C. STEVEN 
HATCH, as a resident and taxpayer of Utah >-
County, I 
Plaintiffs, Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11369 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Appellant respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing 
and reconsideration of the decision in this case filed April 2, 
1969. 
This petition is based upon the following grounds: 
1. The Court erred as a matter of law because there was 
no showing that the State Tax Commission acted with an in-
2 
tentional, systematic, deliberate or fraudulent design to dis-
criminate and thereby violate fundamental constitutional anJ 
legislative principles. And absent such showing the majority 
opinion should, as a matter of law, adopt and reflect Justice 
Crockett's dissent requiring such a finding before the acts of 
the Commission can be overturned. 
2. This Court held that there was no plan or program 
or revaluation in existance. The provisions of Utah Code Anno-
tated 5 9- 5 -46. I, require no written plan, and this Court should 
grant administrativ~ agencies latitude in determining how they 
are to fulfill their respective duties, in the absence of a showing 
of bad faith, or fraudulent purpose. 
3. The action of the State Tax Commission in revaluing 
Provo-Orem properties was an honest, good faith effort by said 
Commission to effectuate the substantial equality in land val-
uations and taxation required by Article XIII, Section 3, of the 
Utah Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
4. This Court erred in voiding the attempts of the State 
Tax Commission to achieve substantial equality by beginning 
in those areas most undervalued and most in need of equali-
zation. The Court, by its decision, has effectively assured the 
continued inequality in land valuation which is contrary to the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah. 
5. If allowed to stand, the decision of this Court will work 
a great burden and hardship upon those taxpayers who present-
ly shoulder a greater load due to unequal valuations, and will 
greatly hamper the efforts of the State Tax Commission to ful-
fill its duties. The recently-adjourned legislature enacted an 
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amended vers10n of Utah Code Annotated, 50-5-46.1, (Senate 
Bill No. 20), which will require a written plan of revaluation, 
and implem~ntation of that law will be greatly hampered, if not 
effectively stopped, in light of the Court's opinion herein. 
6. A property owner has no right to have his property 
undervalued, and in view of the admitted disparity in land val-
uations of many areas of the State, the effect of this Court's 
opinion is to perpetuate, rather than eliminate these disparties. 
If the State Tax Commission's program of revaluation is void-
ed in Provo-Orem, that body is powerless to act even in a 
flagrant case of misvaluation until granted sufficient funds and 
penonnel by the legislature to enable it to revalue all land in 
the State in the short span of five years. Even if administrat-
ively possible, such an accomplishment would be dubious at 
the end of the period, when conceivably the initial assessments 
may be gre1tly inequitable when compared with the final as-
sessments completed in the fifth year. 
7. The Court's decision is ambiguous in that it leaves un-
answered the issue of whether the Commission can make emerg-
ency or spot revaluations in those counties not undergoing a 
cyclical revaluation program in order to correct gross misval-
uations. If the Commission does undertake such emergency re-
valuations, must the Commission, having entered the county on 
an emergency basis, completely revalue the entire county? 
8. The Court's opinion seems to require that the State 
Tax Commission must complete its five-year revaluation pro-
gram before adding any of the revalued property to the tax 
rolls. If this is the intention of the Court, its decision will not 
only greatly hamper the discharge of petitioner's duty to assure 
equal valuJtion, but it is contrary to the weight of case law in 
this area. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTIONS OF THE ST A TE TAX COMMISSION 
IN REVALUING REAL PROPERTY CANNOT BE AT-
TACKED AS VIOLATING EQUAL PROTECTION OR THE 
JUST VALUATION REQUIREMENT OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, AR TI CLE XIII, SECTION 3, IN THE 
ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF A SYSTEMATIC, DEL-
IBERA T, INTENTIONAL OR FRAUDULENT DESIGN TO 
VIOLATE TE:OSE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. 
Mr. Justice Crockett's able dissent has focused on a key 
element of this case. 
"But from what has been made to appear, I am not 
persuaded that the Tax Commission has been arbi-
trary, unreasonable or discriminatory in proceeding 
toward the desired objective." 
Dissenting Opinion, Hanna, ct al v. State Tax Commis-
sion, No. 11369, April 2, 1969, p.4. 
In a recent A.LR. annotation, the problem of constitution-
al challenges to revaluation programs was summed up as fol-
lows: 
" .. the question of violation of constitutional right 
is largely one of the presence or absence of actual 
intention to discriminate, despite the fact of sub-
stantial, and in some instances great, inequality in tax-
ation necessarily resulting from only partial applicat-
ion of new values." 76 A.LR. 2d, at 1077, (emphasis 
supplied); see also; 51 Am. Jur. "Taxation," Section 
170, et seq. 
The ba~ic priniciples of law applicable to this case are set 
forth in Sunday Lake Iron Company t'. Township of Wakefield, 
247 U.S. 350, 38 S. Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918). The state 
of Michigan had valued appellant's mining lands at full value 
for tax purposes, whereas most other property was valued at one-
third marke~ value. 
While recognizing th2t an intentional, systematic under-
valuation contravenes the constitutional rights of one taxed 
at full value, (id., at 352-353,) the Court required the fol-
lowing burden of proof of one challenging a valuation on con-
stitutional grounds: 
" [One must show] something which in effect 
amounts to an intentional violation of the essential 
principal of practical uniformity. The good faith of 
such officers and the 11alidity of their actions are pre-
sumed; when assailed, the burden of proof is upon the 
complaining party." 
Id., at 353, (emphasis supplied). 
Further delineation of the burden upon one challenging 
valuations by taxing officials was expressed in Liggett Company 
u. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933), 
which required an intentional and systematic undervaluation 
to sustain such a challenge, which requirement can only be met 
by evidence of a clear and hostile discrimination against partic-
ular persons and classes. Td,. at 539-540. 
When our sister state of Wyoming valued property of the 
Chicago and Northwestern Railway at 113 113 per cent of act-
ual value, as compared with the usual 60 per cent of actual 
Yalue assigned to other types of property, the railroad chal-
lenged the State's action as a violation of the Equal Protection 
CLrnse. The Supreme Court held that there must be an intent 
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or fraudulent purpose to disregard the fundamental principle 
of uniformity before activities of taxing authorities would be 
considered violation of Equal Protection. The Court said it 
was not discriminatory to undervalue other property. Rowley 
v. Chicago N N. W. Ry., 293 U.S. 102, 111, 5 5 S. Ct. 55, 79 
L.Ed. 222 ( 1934). 
One of the best statements of the law in our area of in-
quiry is in Great Northern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 56 S. 
Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532 (1936), a North Dakota tax-valuation 
case. 
"Overvaluation is not of itself sufficient to warrant 
injunction against any part of taxes based on the 
challenged assessment; mere error of judgment is not 
enough; there must be something that in legal effect 
is the equivalent of intention or fraudulent purpose 
to overvalue the property." 
Id., at 139, (emphasis supplied). 
Admittedly, these cases were concerned with the applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, but a comparable line of 
cases construing State constitutional provisions similar to Utah's 
Article XIII has reached the same result, and requires a show-
ing of a fraudulent, intentional, systematic design to discrim-
inate before one may successfully challenge the actions of tax-
ing authorities. 
Alfred J. .Sweet, Jnr. v. City of Auburn, 180 A. 803, 805 
( 193 5), speakes of a sys::-ematic purpose to cast a disproport-
ionate share of the tax burden on one or a group of taxpayers 
as the only justification for judicial interference in this area, 
requiring "intentional violation of the essential principle of 
practical uniformity." 
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The mere fact that one person's property is assessed at its 
full value and that of others at less than full value, even though 
the statutes 8llow no such discrimination, raises no constitution-
al question, said the court in Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Lubbock 
Independent School District, 8) S. W. 2d 776 (1935). Before 
the court will interfere, it must appear that a rule or system 
of valuation has been adopted by the assessing authority which 
was designed to operate unequ:illy and to violate a fundamental 
constitutional principle. Id., at 778. The fraud requirement in 
Lubbock was defined a3 a conscious failure to exercise the fair 
and impartial judgement the law requires of assessing officers. 
Id. 
Arizona requires that the improper administration of val-
uations be deliberate to sustain a challenge of taxing author-
ities' actions. Duhame v. State Tax Commission, 179 P.2d 252, 
261 (1947). 
Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 66 New 
Mexico 221, 345 P.2d 750 (1959), is the main case in an anno-
tafrm in 76 A.LR. 2d 1077. 
There the county assessor valued 20% of the county real 
property at the uniform rate of 16% of market value, while 
80% of the properties on the tax rolls were valued from 1 % 
to 166% of market value. 
In refusing a property owners challenge of the valuations, 
based on the New Mexico Constitution, Article VIII, Section 
1; the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the taxpayer must 
show either a well-defined and established scheme of discrim-
ination or some fraudulent action. 345 P.2d, at 752. 
"Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in pro-
portion to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal 
and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same 
class." N.M.S. Annotated, 1953, Vol. I, at 176. 
The following is provided for in the Constitution of the 
State of Missouri: "Taxes ... shall be uniform upon the same 
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority 
levymg the tax." Article X, Section 3, R.S.Mo. 1959, vol. 4 
at 4844. 
The limits of the courts to intervene in land revaluation 
by tax authorities was clearly deliniated by the Missouri court 
in May Department Stores Co. v. State Tax Commission, 308 
s.w. 2d 748 (1958). 
"The court may not sit m judgment on the opinion 
and estimates of duly constituted taxing officials and 
substitute their own opinions. (Citations omitted.) 
So far as excessiveness is concerned, the assessment 
must be so grossly excessive as to be entirely incon-
sistent with an honest exercise of judgment before the 
courts rnay intervene." 
Id., at 764. 
On the degree of discrimination necessary to invalidate a 
tax official's actions, Crothers v. County of Santa Cruz, (Cali-
fornia 1st District Court of Appeals,) 151 Cal. App. 2d 219, 
311 P.2d 5 5 7 ( 19 5 7), is instructive. 
"The essential question with respect to the assessment 
of properties of the same or different classes to be de-
termined is as to whether the provisions of the Consti-
tution regarding uniformity in valuation and of the 
laws declaring how uniformity and equality in the 
distribution of the burdens of taxation are to be as-
certained and applied have been fairly conformed to 
or systematically, and intentionally disregarded." 
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Id., at 561 citings Mahoney v. City of San Diego, 198 
California 388, 398, 245 P.2d 189, 193 (1926), which requir-
ed such a degree of discrimination as to evince a willfull and 
systematic disregard of federal and state constitutional require-
ments. Id., ;it 192. 
Clearly, in light of the facts of this case, the actions of 
State Tax Commission officials in the Provo-Orem area were 
not the result of a deliberate, systematic, intentional, fradu-
lent design to violat~ Equai Protection and the uniformity and 
equality required in l:md valuations by Article XIII, Section 
3, of the Utah Constitution. As a matter of law, Mr. Justice 
Crockett's dissenting opinion should be incorporated into the 
majority opinion, to reflect the failure of the Utah County 
plaintiffs to meet the burden of showing an intentional viola-
tion of fundamental principles of uniformity or equality in 
land valuations. 
Petitioner respectfully mbmits that this Court erred in 
not recognizing that the efforts of the State Tax Commission 
under challenge were in fact, good faith efforts by that ad-
ministrative body to fulfill its statutory and constitutional duty. 
This Court held that no plan or program existed, but Utah 
Code Annotated 5 9- 5 -46.1 requires no written plan, and this 
Court should grant the Commission latitude in determining 
how it is to fulfill its duties, absent a showing of bad faith or 
r rrndulent purpose. 
Is it not more likely, in the absence of any showing of an 
''intentional violation of the essential prinicple of practical 
uniformity," Sunday Lake Iron, supra, that the State Tax 
Commission's revaluation of properties in the Provo-Orem area 
w.1s in reality a good faith effort, halted by this suit, to hasten 
the time when all real property in Utah is valued and taxed, 
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as the Constitution requires, uniformly and equally? And 
would not this Court better serve both the constitutional princ-
iples, and its concerns for reascn:ible uniformity and equality 
announced in Harmer, rt al v. State Tax Commission, by sus-
taining this first attempt of the State Tax Commission to eq-
ualize land valuations? 
We respectfully urge this Court to do so, and sustain peti-
tioner's contentions that the earlier decision was erroneous in 
its application of the law to the facts of this case. 
POINT II. 
THE REVALUATION OF PROVO-OREM PROPER TY 
WAS AN HONEST, GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT ON THE 
PART OF THE ST A TE TAX COMMISSION TO FULFILl 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF SUBSTAN-
TIAL EQUALITY IN LAND EVALUATIONS. 
That good faith is the most important element in the work-
ing of a tax bo.1rd is a priniciple all will recognize. The actions 
of a tax board in a situation so sensitive as land revaluation in-
vade a precious area: individual property rights, long recog-
nized as one of man's basic, inherent rights. 
The good faith of taxing officials is presumed. Sunday 
Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, op.Cit., at 353; 
Interstate Oil P ipcline Co. l'. Guilbeau, 46 So. 113 ( 19 5 0). 
In the Sunday La.kc Ircm Case, cited supra at page 5, the 
court said the following of the tax commission's efforts in val-
uing the company's property at full value, other lands at one-
third of value. 
"Its action is not incompatible with an honest effort 
in new and difficult circumstances to adopt valua-
tions not relatively unjust or unequal." 
11 
Id., at 353. 
Petitioner respectfully submits to this court that such an 
malysis of its activities in the Provo-Orem area are subject tc 
the same observation. 
Confronted with express constitutional and statutory re-
quirements, of substantial equality of valuation, petitioner rec-
ognized a complete lack of uniformity of valuation in the 
State. As was pointed out at trial, locally-assessed properties 
have been for years assessed at substantially lower rates than 
state-assessed properties. 
(P. Exh. 3, Def. Exh. 11). 
Utah Code Annotated ) 9-5 -47 requires petitioners to equal-
ize the valuation of taxable property in the various counties 
of the State. 
In a good faith effort to comply, the petitioner began its 
program in the Provo-Orem area. Rather than perpetuating or 
~ccenting variances in valuation, that effort resulted in bringing 
more property values in line with comparable property in o~her 
counties. 
As Mr. Justice Crockett has observed, "I am not persuad-
ed that the Tax Commission has been arbitrary, unreasonable 
or d;scrimin:itory, in proceeding toward the desired objective" 
[ cq ualization of property valuations.]." Dissent, 0 pinion, op. 
cit., p.4. 
Might not this Court more adequately serve to hasten the 
day of equality by allowing the efforts of the Tax Commission 
to St'.1'1d, "as :m honest effort in new and difficult circumstanc-
~s Lo adopt valuations not relatively unjust"? Sunday Lake Iron, 
r1jJ.cit. 
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The Skh111er l'. Nell' Mexico Stale Tax Commission case. 
op.cit., presents a situatirm somewhat parallel to the instJnt 
case. There a county assessor was faced with unequal valuatiun1 
ranging from l % to 166% of market value. The New Mexico 
Constitution requires the same substantial equality of assessment 
as Utah's. His plan was to assess all property at 16% of market 
value, but limitations of fonds and personnel allowed him tn 
complete revaluation of only 20% of the property on the tax 
rolls. Thus, 80% of the taxpayers paid taxes based on the old, 
grossly disparate valuations, while 20% paid a uniform tax based 
on the 16% valuation. 
In sustaining the assessor's actions, the court found that the 
equalization process is a continual one, and that there was nn 
need to complete it within one year. As pointed out earlier, the 
Court recognized the need of a challenging taxpayer to find ~ 
well-defined and established scheme of discrimination or some 
fraudulent action. 345 P.2d, at 752. 
A county Board of Equalization's attempt to increase the 
land valuations of designated tracts in only the commerciJI 
areas of a city was considered in Ma)' Department Stores Co. 
v. State Tax Commjssion, 308 S.W. 2d 748 (1958), a Missouri 
case under J constitutional provision, op.cit., substantially sim-
ilar to Utah's Art. XIII. 
The order increasing land valuations was held not to be in 
violation of State and federal constitutional prinicples because 
immediate, complete revaluation was impossible, and such an 
increase was merely a step toward attaining uniformity of v;1!-
u1tion. 308 S.\V.2d, at '~9. 
In void:ng the actions of the State Tax Commission in the 
Provo-Orem revaluation, this cnurt has effectively sanctioned 
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the continu:lnce of the gross inequality so offensive to it, to the 
citizens of Utah, and to the Utah Constitution. 
As in Skinner, the petitioner herein is severely handicapped 
by lack of funds and personnel. To some extent, the 1969 Leg-
i,bturc has allevi:ited that problem in its new version of Utah 
Code Annotated § 5 9- 5 -46.1. But petitioner respectfully sub-
mits that unless this Court allows it to continue to revalue as 
much as funds and personnel limits allow, the State Tax Com-
mission will come to an abrupt halt in its good faith efforts 
to equalize valuations in accordance with its statutory and 
constitutional obligations. 
As the Skinne1· court observed, equalization is a continual 
process. Even at the end of the Five year period set forth in 
Utah Code Anontated § 5 9-5-46.1, those properties revalued 
Jt the start of the first year, given the normal rise in property 
values gener.11ly, will be undervalued vis-a-vis those properties 
revalued in the waning hours of the cycle. Are we then to scrap 
:ill the past five years' work because we haven't valued all lands 
equally? Hardly, for as the Missouri court observed, supra, 
immediate complete rev:i.luation is impossible. Instead, the peti-
tioner must act as it secs fit, in good faith, to equalize the most 
grossly misvalucd properties first, as a first step of many on 
the ro:id to rnbstantial equality and uniformity on a state-wide 
basis. 
Requiring, as h:is this court, completion of cyclical reval-
uations in one county at a time, seriously hampers the petitioner 
in fulfilling its duties. Petitioner respectfully urges this Court 
to reconsider the portion of its opinion on this matter, in the 
light of the case law set forth hereinabove, and Mr. Justice 
Crockett's dissent, cited previously. 
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POINT III. 
IF ALLOWED TO ST AND, THIS COURT'S OPINION 
THREATENS TO PRECLUDE ANY EFFECTIVE ACTION 
BY PETITIONER IN DISCHARGE OF ITS CONSTITUT-
ION AL AND ST A TUTOR Y DUTIES. 
As a basis for its opinion, this court held that since land 
valuations were not sub~t<!ntially uniform or equal in Utah or 
Utah County, respondent-taxpayers' properties could not be 
added to the tax rolls, despite the fact that the revaluation tend-
ed to conform these properties to a more equal valuation vis-a-
vis other like property. 
Also, it was expressly stated that the intent of the legisla-
ture was to require each revaluation program to be completed 
a county at a time. 
Carried to its logical conclusion, this line of reasoning seems 
to require a full county to be revalued before any properties 
can be added to the tax roll. Petitioner respectfully submits 
that this extension of logic shows the error of the Court's hold-
ing on this point. 
Petitioner has cited Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Com-
mission, supra at page 7, where a county assessor placed reval-
ued properties on his tax rolls along with grossly misvalued 
properties. 
The Court effectively characterized the nature of the ox-
payer's challenge in that instance, which is strikingly parellel 
to the inst:mt case. 
"Here, appellants have shown no discrimination or 
fraud, nor did they ,1sk that all other property be im-
mediately raised in assessed value. On the contrary, 
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they sav, in effect, 'we have been under-assessed in 
the past and we must continue to be under-assessed 
until every other piece of property is placed on the tax 
rolls at comparitive, though less than market 
values.' " 
345 P.2d, at 752. 
The Skinner court then answered this contention, as peti-
tioner submits this court should have answered that of respond-
ent -taxpayers, by citing Hamilton v. Adkins, 250 Alabama 
757, 35 So.2d 183 (1948), cert.den., 335 U.S. 861. That well-
reasoned opinion held that before discrimination violative of 
constitutional provisions can be found in assessment or valuation 
by taxing authorities. 
. . . it is necessary that the action of the admini-
strative officials be more than mere error in judgment 
or result in more than inequality in valuation. It must 
be shown that the officials are chargeable with a pur-
pose or design to discriminate by a systematic meth-
od." 
Id., at 184. 
For purposes of this pet1t1on, it is important to note that 
the Abbama court was considering a revaluation program only 
one-fourth completed at the end of the year, due to limitations 
in budget and personnel availahle for the task. 
Petitioner contends that is is not necessary, in the light of 
,lpplicable case bw, for a revaluation program to be completed 
before any revalued properties may be added to the tax rolls. 
Regrettably, this court's opinion, if allowed to stand, compels a 
contrary c0nclusion, and runs counter to the current state of 
the hw in this field. 
In accord with the Yiews of the Missouri and Alabama 
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decisions are two California cases m the First District Court 
of Appeals. 
Alberts v. Board of Supervisors of County of San Mateo, 
193 Cal. App. 2d 225, 14 Cal.Rptr. 72 (1961), hearing denied 
by State Supreme Court, August 16, 1961, held that a cyclical 
reappraisal program that is not completed is not discriminatory, 
and those properties reappraised may be legally added to the 
tax rolls before all property has been reappraised. See also: Lord 
v. County of Marin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 248 ( 1963). 
Petitioner is confronted with a related problem due to 
this Court's holding, and respectfully requests the Court to 
consider and give petitioner the benefit of its opinion on the 
following: 
"May the State Tax Commission, in furtherance of 
its duty to assure a uniform rate of valuation, re-
value property in a county that is not at the time 
undergoing the statutory cyclical revaluation pro-
gram?" 
The problem arises when land development takes place in 
a county changing the use of the property, often increasing its 
value many-fold. For instance, what was once farm land, may 
in the space of a few months become a sub-division or shopping 
center. If this occurs just after the State Tax Commission has 
completed its revaluation program in that county, the property 
may be grossly undervalued for as many as five years, unless 
the Commission can make a spot-revaluation. 
This Court's opinion seems to answer the query in the 
negative, but petitioner respectfully urges consideration of the 
following points. 
1. Such a holding m effect impedes implimentation of 
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the constitutional requirement of substantial equality or uni-
formity. 
2. The case law seems to indicate no violation of consti-
tutional provisions occurs when spot revaluations are undertaken 
by taxing authorities. 
May DPpartment StorPs Co. v. State Tax Commission, 308 
S.W. 2d 7 48 ( 19 5 8), citcJ s11 pra at page 8, was a case under 
the Missouri Constitution's Art. X, Sect'.on 3, which requires 
substantial uniformity of assessment. 
The application of that provision, and the Equal Protection 
Clause, to a County Board of Equalization's attempts to in-
crease the land values of designated tracts in only the commerc-
ial areas of '.1 city was the concern of the Missourr Court. 
The order increasing those specific land valuations was 
held to be valid because immediate, complete revaluation was 
impossible and such an incre::ise in specific properties was mere-
ly a step toward att:lining uniformity of valuation in that area. 
Id., ;)t 759. 
The State Tax Commission contends that spot revaluations, 
made in an honest '.lttempt to fulfill the constitutional stand-
ard of equality of valuation, shouid be valid, but that if this 
Court's opinion is allowed to stand, serious doubts are present 
as to whether such action is possible in Utah. 
Petitioner respectfully asks this court to consider this vital 
question, and to render an opinion thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the majority opm10n 
m this case is contrary to accepted legal authority; that the 
di,senting orinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Crockett 
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correctiy interprets rhe law applicable to the case and should 
be adcpted ;:i~ p:.n of the nujority opinion. 
The opmion as it now stands perpetuates the very inequi-
ties this court found to be so objectionable and opens the door 
to continued litig:1rio11 each time a plan of rearpc1_isal is com-
menced within a county. The effect of such litigation would 
be to preclnde :my comprehensive reappraisal program initiated 
by rhe Commission or contempbted by the 1969 Utah Legisla-
ture when it amended Section 59-5-46.1, Utah Code Annotat-
ed. 
The decision is 1mbiguous in that it does not cle:uly state 
when re-valued property is to be pbced upon the tax rolls nor 
does it consider the problems attendant to an expanding econ-
omy where property v:ilues change overnight. It appears to 
preclude any spot revaluations in counties not being revalued 
under a cyclical revalu:ition program, thereby perpetuating 
existing and newly :irising inequities. 
Petitio11ei- therefore respec1fully urges this honorable court 
to recons:der its decision in this case. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
